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IT'S TIME TO BELIEVE: RESOLVING THE
CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE GOOD-FAITH
EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Blake R. Hills*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Consider a scenario in which the police obtain a warrant to search
the home of a suspected murderer. During the search, the officers find
the knife that was used to commit the murder and also find clothing of
the suspect that has the victim's blood on it. Based on this evidence, the
prosecution charges the suspect with murder in what appears to be an
open and shut case. However, the trial court subsequently concludes that
the probable cause supporting the warrant was based in part on
improperly obtained evidence. Should the knife and bloody clothes be
suppressed and a suspected murderer set free? Or should the evidence be
admissible because the police operated in good-faith reliance on the
magistrate's issuance of the search warrant?
In United States v. Leon,' the Supreme Court held that although the
exclusionary rule generally bars the introduction of evidence obtained
during an improper search, the exclusionary rule does not apply when
officers have acted in good-faith reliance on a search warrant even
though the warrant is not supported by probable cause.2 Unfortunately,
the Court failed to answer the question of whether the good-faith
exception applies when the facts supporting probable cause in the
warrant affidavit were obtained through a prior improper search. This
has led to a split between the circuits, with varying answers.The
*

Prosecuting Attorney,

Summit County Utah Attorney's

Office, J.D., S.J.

Quinney

University of Utah College of Law (1998). The views and opinions expressed in this article are
solely those of the Author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Summit County Attorney's

Office.
1. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
2. Id. at 925-26.
3. See id. at 913-14.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Bain, 874 F.3d 1, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2017) (internal quotations
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resulting system of rules that depends on location is a significant
problem that should be fixed by the Supreme Court.
This Article proceeds in several parts. Part II contains a discussion
of the general principles regarding the Fourth Amendment and search
warrants. Part III examines the Leon decision, with discussion on what
the Supreme Court did and did not say about the good-faith exception to
the exclusionary rule. 6 Part IV surveys the split of authority amongst the
federal circuit courts.' Finally, Part V suggests that the Court should be
guided by both its post-Leon decisions and by general policy
considerations to hold that the good-faith exception applies when the
prior search was objectively reasonable and the warrant affidavit
truthfully conveyed the circumstances of the prior improper search to
the magistrate.8
II.

BACKGROUND OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

American search and seizure law can all be traced back to the
Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
9
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
It is well-recognized that "the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is 'reasonableness."" 0 "Where a search is undertaken by
law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal
wrongdoing, . . . reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a
Obtaining a search warrant "ensures that the
judicial warrant.""
inferences to support a search are 'drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often

omitted) (holding that police officers can rely on evidence in good faith when the evidence is "close
enough to the line of validity to make the officers' belief in the validity of the warrant objectively

reasonable"); United States v. Ganias, 824 F.3d 199, 223 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that "suppression
is inappropriate where reliance on a warrant was 'objectively reasonable'); United States v.

Mowatt, 513 F.3d 395, 405 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that the good-faith exception does not apply
when a search warrant is based on a prior, unlawful search).
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part M.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See infra Part V.

9. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
10. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
11. Vemonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).
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competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."' 12 In the absence of a
warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception
to the warrant requirement.1 3
The exclusionary rule generally provides that the prosecution
cannot introduce evidence in its case-in-chief that was obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.14 The Supreme Court first adopted
this rule for federal prosecutions in the 1914 case of Weeks v. United
States." In that case, the defendant's private papers were seized during a
warrantless search of his room in a private house. 16 In holding that the
improperly seized documents could not be used against the defendant at
trial, the Court stated:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used
in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of
the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such
searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed
are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The
efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and
suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental
law of the land. 17
The Court stated that "[t]o sanction such proceedings would be to
affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of
the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the
people against such unauthorized action." 18 However, the Court
determined that the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule only
applied to federal and not state actors.19
It was not until 1949 that the Supreme Court incorporated the
Fourth Amendment against the States in Wolf v. Colorado.20
Specifically, the Court held that "[t]he security of one's privacy against
arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth

12. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10,14 (1948)).
13. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011).
14. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987) ("When evidence is obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment, the judicially developed exclusionary rule usually precludes its use in a
criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure.").

15. 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), overruledby Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
16. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 387-89.
17. Id. at 393.
18. Id. at 394.
19. Id. at 398.
20. 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruledon other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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Amendment-is . . implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as
such enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause" of
the Fourteenth Amendment.2 1 However, the Court held that the
22
exclusionary rule was not enforceable against the States. The Court
began its analysis by stating that the exclusionary rule "was not derived
from the explicit requirements of the Fourth Amendment [and] it was
not based on legislation expressing Congressional policy in the
enforcement of the Constitution," but "was a matter of judicial
implication." 2 3 The Court noted that because "most of the Englishspeaking world does not regard as vital to such protection the exclusion
of evidence thus obtained, [it] must hesitate to treat this remedy as an
essential ingredient of the right." 24 Thus, the Court ultimately concluded:
Granting that in practice the exclusion of evidence may be an effective
way of deterring unreasonable searches, it is not for this Court to
condemn as falling below the minimal standards assured by the Due
Process Clause a State's reliance upon other methods which, if
consistently enforced, would be equally effective.25
The Supreme Court eliminated the States' discretion to come up
with their own remedies for Fourth Amendment violations in Mapp v.
Ohio. 2 6 The Court held that "all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority,
inadmissible in a state court." 2 7 The Court stated that:
[O]ur holding that the exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments is not only the logical dictate of
prior cases, but it also makes very good sense. There is no war between
the Constitution and common sense. Presently, a federal prosecutor
may make no use of evidence illegally seized, but a State's attorney
across the street may, although he supposedly is operating under the
enforceable prohibitions of the same Amendment. Thus the State, by
admitting evidence unlawfully seized, serves to encourage
disobedience to the Federal Constitution which it is bound to uphold.
Moreover, ... "[t]he very essence of a healthy federalism depends
upon the avoidance of needless conflict between state and
federal courts." 28

21. Wolf 338 U.S. at 27-28.
22. Id. at 33.
23. Id. at 28.
24. Id. at 29.
25. Id. at 31.
26. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
27. Id at 655.
28. Id at 657-58.
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The Court noted that allowing the States to use other remedies to
enforce the Fourth Amendment had proven to be of "obvious futility." 2 9
Moreover:
[I]t was logically and constitutionally necessary that the exclusion
doctrine-an essential part of the right to privacy-be also insisted
upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the
Wolf case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional right by
Wolf could not consistently tolerate denial of its most important
constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which
an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure.
To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its
privilege and enjoyment. 30
"After Mapp, it is taken for granted that the federal remedy follows
the federal violation" and "[n]o state would ever hold that there was a
federal violation but then apply its own state rule to remedy that
violation." 31 The basic rationale of Weeks, Wolf and Mapp was that the
exclusionary rule was mandated by the Constitution.3 2 However, this
understanding of the exclusionary rule changed in 1974 in United States
33
v. Calandra.
In Calandra, the Supreme Court held that the
exclusionary rule was not a "personal constitutional right," but a mere
"judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect." 3 4 Indeed, the Court stated:
Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never
been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all
proceedings or against all persons. As with any remedial device, the
application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.s
The Court emphasized that "[t]he purpose of the exclusionary rule
is not to redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim," but rather
"to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the
guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and

29. Id. at 652-53.
30. Id. at 655-56.
31.

Megan McGlynn, Competing Exclusionary Rules in Multistate Investigations: Resolving

Conflicts ofState Search-and-SeizureLaw, 127 YALE L.J. 406, 419 (2017).
32.

See Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment's Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional

Right, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM L. 357, 357, 362, 364-66 (2013) ("[T]he rule in Weeks and many years
thereafter was considered constitutionally mandated.").

33. 414U.S.338(1974).
34. Id. at 348.
3 5. Id.
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seizures." 3 6 With this understanding of the exclusionary rule, the
Supreme Court is now better able to create exceptions to the rule when
its costs outweigh its deterrence value.
III.

UNITED STATES V. LEON

The Supreme Court established a good-faith exception to the
7
exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon.3 The case began when a
confidential informant of "unproven reliability" told a police officer that
two people he knew were selling large amounts of cocaine and
methamphetamine out of their residence. Specifically, the informant
stated that he had witnessed a sale ofmethaqualone at the residence five
months earlier. 39 This information led to a police investigation focusing
on this residence and two other residences associated with
potential suspects.40
During the investigation, the police learned that the residences were
41
occupied by people who had prior convictions for drug offenses. The
police also observed that the residences were occasionally visited by
other people with prior drug involvement who entered the residences and
left with small packages. 4 2 Based on this information, the police applied
for a search warrant to search the three residences for evidence of drugtrafficking activities. 4 3 A State Superior Court Judge then issued a
"facially valid search warrant."" The subsequent searches resulted in the
discovery of large quantities of drugs at two of the residences and a
45
This led to the indictment of
small amount at a third residence.
charges.4 6
distribution
and
conspiracy
for
multiple defendants
The defendants each filed motions to suppress the evidence seized
pursuant to the warrant. 4 7 After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
concluded that the affidavit for the search warrant was insufficient to
establish probable cause. 4 8 The court made it clear that the officers "had

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id at 347.
468 U.S. 897 (1984).
Id. at 901.
Id.
Id
Id at 901-02.
Id at 902.
Id
Id
Id
Id.
Id. at 903. The defendants' motions challenged the searches of all three residences and

their automobiles, and any statements they made during the search. Id at 903 n.1.

48. Id. at 903.
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acted in good faith," but the court rejected the prosecution's argument
that the exclusionary rule should not apply when evidence is seized in
"reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant." 9
The government appealed, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial
court's ruling. 5 0 The Ninth Circuit held that the warrant was not
supported by probable cause because the affidavit failed to establish the
informant's credibility, facts in the affidavit were stale, and these
deficiencies were not cured by the police investigation." The court also
declined the government's invitation to recognize a good-faith exception
to the exclusionary rule. 5 2 The government then appealed to the Supreme
Court. 53 The government did not appeal the lower court's determination
that the warrant was unsupported by probable cause and only presented
the question of "[w]hether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
should be modified so as not to bar the admission of evidence seized in
reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant that is subsequently
held to be defective."54
The Supreme Court began its discussion by acknowledging that
"[1]anguage in opinions of this Court and of individual Justices has
sometimes implied that the exclusionary rule is a necessary corollary of
the Fourth Amendment.... or that the rule is required by the
conjunction of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments." 5 The Court
dispatched of this implication rather quickly by stating that "[t]he Fifth
Amendment theory has not withstood critical analysis or the test of
time,
and "the Fourth Amendment 'has never been interpreted to
proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings
or against all persons."'s?

The Court then turned to the costs and benefits of the exclusionary
rule." The Court stated that "[w]hether the exclusionary sanction is
appropriately imposed in a particular case, our decisions make clear, is
'an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 904.
Id.
Id. at 904-05.
Id. at 905.
Id.

54. Id. The Supreme Court indicated that it was within its power to consider whether probable
cause existed under the "totality of the circumstances" test of Illinois v. Gates, but the Court

declined to do so because the issue had not been briefed or argued. Id.
55. Id. at 905-06 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651, 655-57 (1961); id at 661-62
(Black, J., concurring); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462-63 (1928); Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20, 33-34 (1925)).
56. Id. at 906 (citing Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 472-74 (1976)).
57. Id. (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976)).
58. Id. at 906-07.
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rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police
conduct.'"' In addition, the Court noted:
"Our cases have consistently recognized that unbending application of
the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude
would impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and
jury.". . . Particularly when law enforcement officers have acted in
objective good faith or their transgressions have been minor, the
magnitude of the benefit conferred on . . guilty defendants offends
basic concepts of the criminal justice system. Indiscriminate
application of the exclusionary rule, therefore, may well "generat[e]
disrespect for the law and administration of justice." Accordingly,
"[a]s with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been
restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most
60
efficaciously served."

The Court concluded that a balancing of costs and benefits
"forcefully suggest[s] that the exclusionary rule be more generally
modified to permit the introduction of evidence obtained [with] the
reasonable good-faith belief that a search or seizure was in accord with
the Fourth Amendment." 6 1
The Court ultimately held that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable
"when an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search
warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope., 6 2 This is
because "there is no police illegality and thus nothing to deter." 6 3 It is
the magistrate's duty to determine whether a warrant is supported by
probable cause, and a police officer should not be expected to question
the magistrate's determination. 64 "Penalizing the officer for the
magistrate's error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the
deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations." 6 5
The Court did indicate that the good-faith exception would not
apply in certain circumstances. Specifically, the Court stated that an
officer would not be acting in good faith if the magistrate issuing the
warrant was misled by information in the affidavit that the officer knew
was false or should have known except for a reckless disregard of the
truth. 6 6 An officer would also not be acting in good faith if the issuing

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 906 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983)).
Id. at 907-08 (citations omitted).
Id at 908-09 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 255 (White, J., concurring in judgment)).
Id at 919-20.
Id. at 921.
Id.
Id.
Id at 923 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 168-69 (1978)).
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magistrate had "wholly abandoned" her judicial role. 6 7 In addition, an
officer would not be acting in good faith if the affidavit was "so lacking
in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
entirely unreasonable."' 6 8Further, an officer would not be acting in good
faith if the warrant was so facially deficient that a reasonable officer
could not presume the warrant to be valid. 6 9 Because the officers acted in
good faith reliance on the warrant, the Court held that the trial court
erred when it applied the exclusionary rule and suppressed the evidence
*
in the
case. 70
Although the Supreme Court indicated that the good-faith exception
would not be applicable in these specific situations, it did not answer the
question of whether the exception applies when the facts supporting
probable cause in the warrant affidavit were obtained through a prior
improper search. This has led to a split between the circuits. 7
IV.

CIRCUIT SPLIT

It is not surprising that, when left on their own, the circuit courts
have taken a variety of positions on whether the good-faith exception
applies when the facts supporting probable cause in the warrant affidavit
were obtained through a prior improper search. Some circuits have
concluded that the good-faith exception does not apply when the
probable cause for the warrant is based on improperly obtained
evidence. 7 2 Other circuits have concluded that the good-faith exception
applies if the predicate search was arguably lawful under existing
precedent at the time of the search.7 3 Still others have concluded that the
good-faith exception applies if the predicate search was arguably
reasonable and the warrant affidavit truthfully conveyed the
circumstances of the improper predicate search to the magistrate judge.7 4

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id. (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part)).
Id.
Id. at 903, 905, 922, 925.
Sed infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.B.
See infra PartIV.C.
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Not Applicable when ProbableCause Is Based on an
ImproperSearch

1. Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit addressed the applicability of the good-faith
exception when probable cause is based on a prior improper search in
UnitedStates v. Mowatt.75 The case began when three officers responded
to a complaint that loud music and the odor of marijuana were coming
from an apartment in a high-crime area.7' The officers were able to
identify the apartment, and they knocked on the door.7 7 Mowatt initially
refused to open the door, but he eventually opened it approximately
twelve to thirteen inches after repeated demands from the officers. The
officers observed that Mowatt appeared to be holding something in his
hand behind his back, which caused the officers to fear for their safety.7 9
This led to a chain of events in which the officers entered the apartment
to subdue Mowatt and the refrigerator was knocked open during the
resulting struggle.so
After Mowatt was subdued, the officers noticed that a "plastic bag
containing several hundred pink pills" was in the refrigerator. "Based
on his training and experience," one of the officers concluded that the
pills were methylenedioxymethamphetamine, commonly known as
ecstasy. 8 2 Based on this observation, the officers sought and obtained a
search warrant for the residence. 83 During the subsequent search, officers
found multiple firearms, ammunition, a body armor vest, and
approximately $20,000 in cash.8 4 This evidence led to Mowatt being
charged with multiple drug and firearm-related offenses.8 5
Mowatt subsequently moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that
it was the fruit of an unconstitutional search.8 6 The prosecution argued,
in part, that even if the initial entry into the apartment was unlawful, the
evidence was admissible because the officers relied in good faith on the
75. 513 F.3d 395 (4th Cir. 2008), abrogatedon othergrounds by Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S.
452(2011).
76. Id at 397.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id at 397-98.
81. Id at 398.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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search warrant. 87 The trial court denied the motion on several grounds,
one being that the officers acted in good faith.
The Fourth Circuit began its analysis by concluding that the initial
entry into Mowatt's residence was an unlawful search that was not
justified by exigent circumstances. 8 9 The court also found that the search
warrant would not have been sought, and thus not obtained, without the
unlawful entry into the residence. 90
The court then turned to the government's argument that the
good-faith exception of Leon was applicable and the evidence should not
be suppressed. 9 1 The court rejected the argument, stating, "The Leon
exception does not apply here because Leon only prohibits penalizing
officers for their good-faith reliance on magistrates' probable cause
determinations. Here, the exclusionary rule operates to penalize the
officers for their violation of Mowatt's rights that preceded the
magistrate'sinvolvement."9 2
Essentially, the court held that the good-faith exception does not
apply when the government's reason for seeking a search warrant is
based on a prior, unlawful search. 9 3
2. Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit addressed the applicability of the good-faith
exception when probable cause is based on a prior improper search in
United States v. Scott.9 4 The case began when police officers used a
confidential informant to purchase heroin from an individual named
Reynolds. 9 5Rather than completing the drug sale at the arranged
location at a motel, Reynolds drove the informant's car to Scott's home
while the informant waited at a gas station. 9 6 When Reynolds arrived at
Scott's home, Scott came out to the car and made several incriminating
statements that were recorded by a device hidden in the car. 97 Reynolds
then returned to the informant and handed over 1.7 grams of heroin. 98 A

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 399.
Id.
Id. at 400-01.
Id. at 404.
Id.

92.

Id. at 405 (citation omitted).

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
731 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 661.
Id. at 661-62.
Id. at 662.
Id.
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subsequent controlled buy occurred five days later that was substantially
similar, although there was no recording of any conversations. 99
The police subsequently applied for and received a warrant to
search Scott's house.1 oo During the search, officers found a handgun and
significant quantities of various drugs.1 0 1 Scott was indicted for firearm
and drug-related charges, and he moved to suppress the evidence on the
grounds that the driveway conversation was recorded illegally and
without the contents of the driveway conversation, the police would not
have had probable cause to obtain a search warrant.1 0 2 The motion
was denied.10 3
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by stating that "evidence
discovered pursuant to a warrant will be inadmissible if the warrant was
secured from a judicial officer through the use of illegally acquired
information." 10 4 However, the court noted that "[a] search warrant
obtained, in part, with evidence which is tainted can still support a
search if the 'untainted information, considered by itself, establishes
probable cause for the warrant to issue."'1 0 The court then held that
because the search warrant affidavit contained sufficient facts to
establish probable cause apart from the information about the recorded
conversation, the search warrant was valid and the motion to suppress
was properly denied. 1 06
3. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit addressed the applicability of the good-faith
exception when probable cause is based on a prior improper search in
United States v. Vasey. 1 0 7 In that case, Vasey was stopped for speeding
and was arrested when the officer discovered that there was an
outstanding warrant for his arrest.10 When a backup officer arrived, the
two officers searched Vasey's vehicle and found $5000 and a container
with three white pills. 109 The officers then "terminated the search and

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 662-63.
Id. at 662.
Id. at 664 (citing United States v. Oakley, 944 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1991)).
Id. (citing United States v. Gray, 410 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 2005)).
Id. at 665-66.
834 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1987).
Id at 784.
Id.
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decided to obtain a [search] warrant."o The warrant was approved and
the officers found $71,111 in cash and three kilograms of cocainei"'
Vasey subsequently moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that
the searches violated the Fourth Amendment as well as the Washington
State Constitution. 1 1 2The trial court ultimately denied the motion,
finding that the initial warrantless search was proper as a search incident
to arrest, and which validated the subsequent warrant. 1 3
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by examining the lawfulness of
the initial warrantless search. 114 The court held that the search was not a
proper search incident to arrest because the search was not limited to the
area within Vasey's immediate control and it was not conducted
contemporaneously with the arrest. 1 1 5In addition, the court held that
because the initial search was invalid, the evidence found during that
search was tainted and should not have been included in the affidavit for
the search warrant.' 1 6 Without this information in the affidavit, the
remaining facts were insufficient to establish probable cause and the
warrant was therefore invalid." 7
The Ninth Circuit then turned to the question of whether the
evidence should be deemed admissible under the good-faith exception to
the exclusionary rule."' The court held that Leon's good-faith exception
did not apply because "[t]he constitutional error was made by the officer
in this case, not by the magistrate as in Leon." 1 l9 The court stated that in
its view:

The Leon Court made it very clear that the exclusionary rule should
apply (i.e. the good faith exception should not apply) if the exclusion
of evidence would alter the behavior of individual law enforcement
officers or the policies of their department. Officer Jensen's
conducting an illegal warrantless search and including evidence found
in this search in an affidavit in support ofa warrant is an activity that
the exclusionary rule was meant to deter. 120

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
395 U.S.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
States v.

Id.
Id. at 785.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 785-88.
Id. at 786-87 (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981); Chimel v. California,
752, 763 (1969)).
Id at 788 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 491-92 (1963)).
Id.
Id. at 789-90.
Id. at 789.
Id. (first citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984); and then citing United
Whiting, 781 F.2d 692, 698 (9th Cir. 1986)).
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In addition, the court concluded that "a magistrate's consideration
does not protect from exclusion evidence seized during a search under a
warrant if that warrant was based on evidence seized in an
unconstitutionalsearch."'21
4. Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit addressed the applicability of the good-faith
exception when probable cause is based on a prior improper search in
United States v. Loera.12 2 The case began when FBI agents obtained a
warrant and searched Loera's electronics for evidence of computer
fraud.' 23 While they were searching, the agents discovered child
pornography on four of Loera's CDs.1 2 4 After the agents completed the
search, they seized various devices that appeared to contain evidence of
computer fraud, along with the four CDs that contained child
pornography. 12 5 One week later, an agent reopened the CDs that
contained child pornography in order to be able to describe the images in
an affidavit for a second search warrant.12 6 The warrant was approved,
and agents found more child pornography when they executed
the warrant.' 2 7
Loera was subsequently indicted for multiple counts of possessing
child pornography and filed a motion to suppress the child pornography
evidence.1 2 8 The district court denied the motion, and Loera appealed,
arguing that the searches conducted pursuant to the first warrant
exceeded the scope of the warrant and the searches conducted pursuant
29
to the second warrant were unlawful because the warrant was invalid.1
The Tenth Circuit held that the initial search was valid because it
pursuant to a valid search warrant. 1 30 However, the court
conducted
was
held that the search of the CDs one week later was improper because it
was directed at finding child pornography, rather than computer fraud as
authorized by the warrant.131 Without the tainted information in the

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 789-90.
923 F.3d 907 (10th Cir. 2019).
Id at 912.
Id at 912-13.
Id at 913.
Id
Id at 914.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 921-22.
Id. at 922.
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affidavit that came from this improper search, there was insufficient
evidence to support probable cause for the second warrant. 13 2
The Tenth Circuit then turned to the question of whether the
evidence discovered under the second search warrant was admissible
under the good-faith exception.' 3 3 The court held that the good-faith
exception did not apply because "the illegality at issue stems from
unlawful police conduct, rather than magistrate error, and therefore the
deterrence purposes of the Fourth Amendment are best served by
applying the exclusionary rule."' 34 The court concluded that penalizing
an officer for her own error does contribute to the deterrence of Fourth
Amendment violations.13 5

'

5. Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the applicability of the good-faith
exception when probable cause is based on a prior improper search in
United States v. McGough.1 36 The case began when McGough locked his
five-year-old daughter in his apartment and left to pick up a pizza. 137 The
daughter tried to call her aunt but called 911 by mistake and abruptly
hung up so she would not get in trouble.1 38 This led to a chain of events
in which the police responded, arrested McGough when he came back,
and then entered the residence with the five-year-old to get her some
shoes.1 3 9 The entry into the residence was made over McGough's
objection. 4 0 Once inside the residence, officers observed marijuana and
a gun that the five-year-old said McGough "uses to kill people."1 4
The officers then sought and obtained a search warrant for the
residence.1 4 2 During the search, officers discovered firearms, marijuana,
and a large amount of cash.1 4 3 McGough was indicted for a number of
crimes and subsequently filed a motion to suppress that was denied by
the district court.'"
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 924-25.
Id. at 925.
Id. (emphasis added).

135. Id. at 926. However, the court ultimately held that the evidence was admissible under the
inevitable discovery doctrine because the child pornography would have eventually been discovered
as agents searched for evidence of computer fraud under the original search warrant. Id. at 927-29.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

412 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1233.
Id.
Id. at 1233-34.
Id. at 1234.
Id.
Id. at 1235.
Id
Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by holding that the fiveyear-old's need for shoes was not compelling enough to justify the
14 5
warrantless entry into McGough's residence. The court then turned to
the question of whether the evidence was admissible under the
good-faith exception.146 The court stated that "[s]ince the purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police misconduct, when officers
engage in an 'objectively reasonable law enforcement activity' and act in
good faith and in reliance on a search warrant from a judge, the Leon
good-faith exception applies." 1 4 7 Because the warrantless entry of the
residence to obtain shoes was not an objectively reasonable police
activity, the search warrant affidavit was "tainted with evidence obtained
as a result of a prior, warrantless, presumptively unlawful entry into a
personal dwelling." 14 8 Thus, the court held that the good-faith exception
was not applicable. 14 9
B.

Applicable when PriorSearch Was Arguably Lawful at the Time

1. First Circuit
The First Circuit addressed the applicability of the good-faith
exception when probable cause is based on a prior improper search in
United States v. Bain.1 5 0 The case began when agents from the Drug
Enforcement Agency used a cooperating witness to make controlled
buys of heroin from Bain."s Police officers subsequently arrested Bain
when he came out of a house, and they seized a set of keys from his
person.1 5 2 The officers then used the keys to unlock the front door to the
house and then to test the keys on the doors to three separate residential
units in the house. 1 5 3 The keys fit the door to Unit D, so the officers
conducted a protective sweep and then sought and obtained a warrant for
Unit D.1 5 4 The subsequent search produced drugs, cash, a firearm, a
credit-card-making machine, drug paraphernalia, and identification
materials that tied Bain to Unit D. 5 5 The district court denied Bain's
145.
146.
147.
148.
2001)).
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.at 1239.
Id.
Id. at 1239-40 (quoting United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1313 (llth Cir. 2002)).
Id. at 1240 (quoting United States v. Meixner, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1078 (E.D. Mich.
Id.
874 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017).
Id. at 9.
Id at 10.
Id
Id
Id. at 10-11.
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subsequent motion to suppress, ruling that testing the key in the lock of
Unit D and the resulting protective sweep were illegal searches but
found that the evidence was admissible because the officers relied in
good faith on legal precedent when they turned the key.1 5 6
The First Circuit began its analysis by concluding that testing the
key on the lock of Unit D was a search' that was unreasonable, and
thus, violated the Fourth Amendment.' 5 The court then turned to the
question of whether the good-faith exception applied.1 59 The court
recited the four situations identified by Leon where the good-faith
exception is not applicable 6 0 and stated: "Here, we have a circumstance
not expressly addressed in Leon: the warrant affidavit forthrightly
discloses facts that establish probable cause, but one of the facts
essential to establishing probable cause (the result of the key turn) was
obtained as a result of an unconstitutional search."16 1
Because the situation was not one expressly identified by Leon, the
question for the First Circuit was whether the test of the key in the lock
was "close enough to the line of validity to make the officers' belief in
the validity of the warrant objectively reasonable."l 62 The court
concluded that because there was no clear precedent at the time of the
key test indicating that such action was an unreasonable search, a
reasonable officer could have concluded that the action was lawful. 163
Thus, the police could rely on the warrant in good faith and the evidence
was admissible.'"
2. Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit addressed the applicability of the good-faith
exception when probable cause is based on a prior improper search in
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 14-16.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 21. The situations are as follows:

(1) if the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an
affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his
reckless disregard of the truth[;] (2) where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his
judicial role; (3) when an affidavit is so lacking in indicia ofprobable cause as to render
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and (4) when, depending on the
circumstances of the particular case, a warrant [is] so facially deficient-i.e., in failing to
particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized-that the executing
officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.

Id (internal quotations omitted) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984)).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 22 (quoting United States v. Hopkins, 824 F.3d 726, 733 (8th Cir. 2016)).
163. Id. at 22-23.
164. Id at 23, 25, 27.
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United States v. Hopkins.1 6 5 The case began when a police officer had
his narcotics dog sniff along the outside walls of a building in which
Hopkins rented a townhome.16 The dog alerted at a point that7 was
6
approximately six to eight inches from Hopkins's front door.1 The
police then applied for and obtained a search warrant for Hopkins's
residence.1 6 8 When the police executed the warrant, they found drugs in
69
the townhome and both a gun and more drugs on Hopkins's person.1
After Hopkins was indicted for possession of narcotics with intent
70
to distribute, he moved to suppress the evidence.1 The district court
denied the motion after concluding that although the dog sniff was
unlawful, the good-faith exception applied and made the evidence
admissible. 1 7 ' Hopkins entered a conditional guilty plea while reserving
his right to appeal.1 72
The Eighth Circuit began its analysis by holding that the dog sniff
73
was an unlawful warrantless search of the curtilage of the residence.1
74
The court then turned to whether the good-faith exception applied.1
The court stated:
In order for the Leon good faith exception to apply to a warrant based
on evidence obtained through a violation of the Fourth Amendment,
"the detectives' prewarrant conduct must have been close enough to
the line of validity to make the officers' belief in the validity of the
75
warrant objectively reasonable."
Thus, the "inquiry is confined to 'the objectively ascertainable
question whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known
76
that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization.""
The Eighth Circuit concluded that the officer's "actions were 'close
enough to the line of validity' to make his belief in the warrant's validity
objectively reasonable." 7 7 Because the governing Supreme Court case
on dog sniffs concerned a single-family residence and Hopkins's
residence was in a multi-family building, the officer had an objectively
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

824 F.3d 726 (8th Cir. 2016).
Id at 729.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id. at 730.
Id.
Id
Id. at 732-33 (citing Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8-10 (2013)).
Id. at 733.
Id. (quoting United States v. Cannon, 703 F.3d 407, 413 (8th Cir. 2013)).
Id (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 n.23 (1984)).
Id (citation omitted).
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reasonable belief that the case did not apply and the search was legal."
In addition, the affidavit for the search warrant disclosed all of the
relevant facts about the dog sniff. 17 9 Therefore, "[o]nce the state court
judge considered these facts and issued the warrant, it was reasonable for
the detectives to believe the warrant was valid." 18 0 Based on these
considerations, the court held that Leon's good-faith exception applied
and the evidence was admissible."s'
3. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit addressed the applicability of the good-faith
exception when probable cause is based on a prior improper search in
United States v. Holley.1 82 The case began when the police received a tip
that Holley was distributing large quantities of marijuana. 18 3 in response,
an officer went to Holley's house on two occasions and had a dog
conduct free air sniffs of the garage door. 18 4 The dog alerted on both
occasions, and the police used these alerts as a basis for obtaining a
search warrant. 1 8 5 During the subsequent search, officers found ten
pounds of marijuana, $9990 in cash, a handgun, and various items that
were indicative of drug distribution. 86 This led to a chain of events in
which officers conducted another dog sniff and then sought and obtained
search warrants for other houses connected with Holley; the resulting
searches had similar results.18 7
Holley was indicted for drug- and firearm-related offenses. 188 He
subsequently moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the dog sniffs
violated the Fourth Amendment.1 89 The district court denied
the motions.19 0
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by stating that the general
rule is:
[E]vidence seized pursuant to a warrant is admissible-even if the
warrant was the product of an illegal search-if two requirements are

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. (citing Cannon, 703 F.3d at 413-14).
Id. at 734.
Id. (quoting Cannon, 703 F.3d at 414).
Id.
831 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 324.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id. at 324-25.
Id. at 325.
Id.
Id
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met: (1) the prior law enforcement conduct that uncovered evidence
used in the affidavit for the warrant must be "close enough to the line
of validity" that an objectively reasonable officer preparing the
affidavit or executing the warrant would believe that the information
supporting the warrant was not tainted by unconstitutional conduct,
and (2) the resulting search warrant must have been sought and
executed by a law enforcement officer in good faith as prescribed
by Leon.

19 1

There was no allegation that the officers did not seek the warrants
in good faith, thus, the only question for the court was whether the dog
sniffs were "close enough to the line of validity" that an objectively
19 2
reasonable officer would not have realized that they were invalid.
Because there was no binding precedent at the time of the dog sniffs that
would indicate that such action was unlawful, the court held that they
1 93
Therefore, the court held
were "close enough to the line of validity."
19 4
that the good-faith exception applied and the evidence was admissible.
4. District of Columbia Circuit
The District of Columbia Circuit addressed the applicability of the
good-faith exception when probable cause is based on a prior improper
19
search in United States v. Thornton. ' In that case, the police had been
96
During the investigation, the
investigating Thornton for gambling.1
a trash can in the back of a
in
bag
garbage
police saw Thornton put a
197
The police then removed the garbage bag from the can and
residence.
198
Based on this
discovered that it contained gambling paraphernalia.
evidence and other information obtained through surveillance, the police
99
applied for and obtained search warrants.1 During the execution of the
search warrants, officers found large amounts of heroin as well as
gambling paraphernalia. 2 0 0 After Thornton was charged, he argued that
the evidence seized under one of the warrants should be suppressed
20 1
The trial court
because there was no probable cause for the warrant.
202
denied the motion.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 326 (citing United States v. Massi, 761 F.3d 512, 528 (5th Cir. 2014)).
Id.
Id. at 327.
Id. at 326-27.
746 F.2d 39 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Id at 41.
Id
Id
Id at 42.
Id at 42-43.
Id at 43.
Id
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The D.C. Circuit found that it was unnecessary to address
Thornton's claim that the search of the garbage bag was
unconstitutional, and without the contents of the bag, there was no
probable cause for a warrant. 2 0 3 This was because the court found that
the good-faith exception was applicable. 2 0 The court stated that under
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Leon,
reliable physical evidence seized by officers reasonably relying on a
warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate . . should be
admissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief. In the absence of an
allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role,
suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or
reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an
objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause. 205
The court noted that there was no evidence the magistrate had
abandoned his neutral role or that any of the statements in the affidavit
were untrue. 2 0 6 In addition, "[i]t was eminently reasonable for the
Superior Court judge, and the police officers, to believe that the trash
bag search was constitutional and its fruits could be used to establish
probable cause. 2 0 7 Thus,the D.C. Circuit upheld the trial court's ruling
that the evidence was admissible.2 0 8
C. Applicable when the PriorSearch Was Arguably Reasonable and
the Affidavit Truthfully Conveys the Circumstancesof the PriorSearch
1. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit addressed the applicability of the good-faith
exception when probable cause is based on a prior improper search in
United States v. Ganias.2 0 9 That case began when Army investigators
obtained a search warrant for the records of a business that was
suspected of defrauding the government. 2 1 0 Pursuant to the warrant, the
investigators seized a number of materials and made mirror image copies
of computer hard drives. 2 1 1 These mirrored drives remained in
government possession for approximately two and a half years, at which
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 48-49.
Id at 49.
Id (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914, 926 (1984)).
Id
Id
Id
824 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2016).
Id at 201.
Id. at 202.
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time the government sought and obtained a second search warrant to
search the mirrored drives.2 1 2 The search pursuant to this second warrant
21 3
Ganias
uncovered evidence that Ganias had engaged in tax evasion.
filed a motion to suppress, arguing that retention of the mirrored drives
2 14
The district
for two and a half years violated the Fourth Amendment.
of
violation
no
been
had
there
court denied the motion after finding that
2 15
the Fourth Amendment. The Second Circuit, sitting en banc, resolved
the case on good faith grounds and did not decide whether the retention
of the mirrored drives was unlawful.2 1 6
The Second Circuit began by stating that under Leon, "exclusion of
evidence is inappropriate when the government acts 'in objectively
reasonable reliance' on a search warrant, even when the warrant is
subsequently invalidated." 2 1 7 However, such reliance "must be
objectively reasonable."2 18 "Thus, to assert good faith reliance
successfully, officers must, inter alia, disclose all potentially adverse
information to the issuing judge."2 1 9
After reciting its general rule, the court rejected Ganias's argument
that good faith reliance on a warrant is never possible when there has
been a prior constitutional violation. 2 2 0 The court held that when officers
have "no 'significant reason to believe' that their predicated act was
indeed unconstitutional" 22 1 and "the issuing magistrate was apprised of
the relevant conduct, so that the magistrate was able to determine
222
whether any predicate illegality precluded issuance of the warrant,"
then "invoking the good faith doctrine does not 'launder [the agents']
prior unconstitutional behavior by presenting the fruits of it to a
magistrate,"' as Ganias suggests. 2 23 In such cases, the good-faith
doctrine simply reaffirms Leon's basic lesson: that suppression
is inappropriate where reliance on a warrant was "objectively
reasonable." 2 24
Because the agents who searched the mirrored hard drives fully
apprised the pertinent facts to the magistrate and did not have any
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 207, 208 n.20.
Id. at 207.
Id at 200, 207-08.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 211.
Id at 221 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984)).
Id (citingLeon, 468 U.S. at 922).
Id (citation omitted).
Id at 223.
Id (quoting United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1281 (2d Cir. 1996)).
Id
Id
Id (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922).
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reason to believe that what they had done was unconstitutional, the
court held that the good-faith exception applied, and the evidence
was admissible.2 25
2. Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit addressed the applicability of the good-faith
exception when probable cause is based on a prior improper search in
United States v. McClain.2 2 6 That case began when a concerned neighbor
called the police and reported that a light was on inside a house that had
been vacant for several weeks.2 2 7 An officer responded, checked the
doors and windows, and found that the front door was slightly ajar.2 2 8
When backup arrived, the two officers entered the house and observed
materials that they concluded were for a marijuana growing operation.2 2 9
These observations caused the police to conduct surveillance on the
house for a number ofweeks. 2 30 This led the officers to conclude that the
three defendants were setting up marijuana growing operations at this
location and multiple others. 2 31 The officers prepared search warrants for
those locations, and the affidavits "explicitly relied in part on evidence
obtained during the initial warrantless search." 2 32 The officers obtained
warrants and subsequently found 348 marijuana plants at the original
house as well as numerous marijuana plants and plant-growing materials
at the other properties.2 3 3
The three defendants were subsequently charged with a number of
drug-related offenses. 2 3 4The defendants all filed motions to suppress,
and the district court granted the motions based on a finding that the
original warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment and the
good-faith exception did not apply. 235 The government appealed.2 36
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by concluding that the original
warrantless search was unlawful because there was no probable cause to
believe that a crime was occurring. 23 7 The court then turned to the
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at 224-26.
444 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2005).
Id at 559.
Id
Id at 560.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id at 560-61.
Id. at 561.
Id.

237. Id. at 563-64. In order to justify a warrantless search, the government must demonstrate
both probable cause and exigent circumstances. Id. at 564. Because there was no probable cause, the

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2020

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 10

784

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 48:761

question of whether the good-faith exception was applicable.2 3 8 The
court stated that the issue boiled down to "whether the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule can apply in a situation in which the
affidavit supporting the search warrant is tainted by evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment."2 3 9 The court held that it could.2 40
The Sixth Circuit stated that under Leon, "evidence seized pursuant
to a warrant, even if in fact obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, is not subject to the exclusionary rule if an objectively
reasonable officer could have believed the seizure valid." 2 41 The court
stated that the officers who conducted the initial warrantless search were
not objectively unreasonable in suspecting that criminal activity was
242
In addition, the court noted that the "warrant affidavit fully
occurring.
disclosed to a neutral and detached magistrate the circumstances
surrounding the initial warrantless search." 24 3 Thus, "[t]here was indeed
nothing more that [the officer] 'could have or should have done under
these circumstances to be sure that his search would be legal."' 2" Based
on these considerations, the court held that the good-faith exception
applied and the evidence was admissible.2 4 5
V.

HAVING FAITH

The failure of the Supreme Court in Leon to specifically address the
good-faith exception when a warrant is based on a prior improper search
has led to a confused mixture of rules that depend on where a trial
occurs. Different outcomes for identical facts based merely on the
location of the court is the very definition of unfairness. This situation is
untenable in a modem age when crimes frequently cross jurisdictional
boundaries. The time has come for the Supreme Court to expressly
recognize that the good-faith exception applies when: (1) the prior
search was objectively reasonable and (2) the warrant affidavit truthfully
conveys the circumstances of the prior search to the magistrate. This is
the rule that is most consistent with both the Court's post-Leon decisions
and with general policy considerations.

court found it unnecessary to determine whether there were exigent circumstances. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 565.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 566 (quoting United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1419 (8th Cir. 1989)).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. (quoting United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1368 (1985)).
245. Id.
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Post-Leon

The Supreme Court has continued to expand the good-faith
6
exception into more and more areas in its post-Leon decisions.2 4 The
reasoning behind these decisions indicates that the good-faith exception
should be applied when a warrant is based on a prior improper search as
long as the prior search was objectively reasonable and the warrant
affidavit truthfully conveys the circumstances of the prior search to
the magistrate.
1. Massachusetts v. Sheppard
The very next case the Supreme Court decided after Leon was
24 7
in which a detective submitted an
Massachusetts v. Sheppard,
application for a search warrant that he informed the magistrate was
defective. 2 4 8Specifically, the detective needed an application for a
warrant in a homicide investigation, but could only find a pre-printed
249
The
application titled "Search Warrant-Controlled Substance."
detective made some changes to the form and advised the magistrate of
the formal discrepancies. 2 5 0 The magistrate assured the detective that he
25 1
would make the necessary changes to make the search warrant valid.
However, the magistrate did not change the part of the warrant that
continued to authorize a search for "controlled substances" and did not
25 2
alter the form to incorporate the affidavit.
25 3
but the
There was no question that the warrant was invalid,
2 54
The Court
Supreme Court held that the good-faith exception applied.
stated that the detective "took every step that could reasonably be
expected" of him by informing the magistrate that there were mistakes
on the forms and then relying on the magistrate's statement that he

246.

See generally Kenneth J. Melilli, What Nearly a Quarter Century of Experience Has

Taught Us About Leon and "Good Faith", 2008 UTAH L. REv. 519, 522, 527, 529, 550 (2008)
("With the arrival of [the post-Leon cases], it is obvious that the good faith principle is not limited to
the Leon fact pattern. This undoubtedly surprised no one, neither proponents nor opponents of Leon
itself. Nevertheless, the fact that Leon is not limited to its own circumstances merely signals the
need for determining, if possible, the principle that marks the perimeters of the good faith
doctrine.").
247. 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
248. Id. at 985-86.
249. Id. at 984-85.
250. Id. at 985-86.
251. Id at 986.
252. Id.
253. See id. at 988 n.5.
254. Id. at 988.
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would make the necessary changes to make the warrant valid.2 5 5 The
Court added:
Whatever an officer may be required to do when he executes a warrant
without knowing beforehand what items are to be seized, we refuse to
rule that an officer is required to disbelieve a judge who has just
advised him, by word and by action, that the warrant he possesses
authorizes him to conduct the search he has requested.25 6
Essentially, the Court held that the good-faith exception applied
because even though the search was based on an invalid warrant, the
detective had fully informed the magistrate about the improper language
in the documents and had relied on the magistrate's assurance that the
warrant was valid.2 5 7 Under this reasoning, the good-faith exception
should also apply when a detective fully informs a magistrate in an
affidavit about the circumstances ofa prior search that provides probable
cause for a warrant and the magistrate issues the warrant.
2. Illinois v. Krull
The Supreme Court expanded the reach of the good-faith exception
again in Illinois v. Krull.2 5 8 In that case, the Court upheld the
admissibility of evidence obtained during a warrantless search conducted
by a police officer who relied on a state statute that was later declared to
be unconstitutional. 2 5 9 The Court stated:
The approach used in Leon is equally applicable to the present case.
The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained
by an officer acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a statute
would have as little deterrent effect on the officer's actions as would
the exclusion of evidence when an officer acts in objectively
reasonable reliance on a warrant. Unless a statute is clearly
unconstitutional, an officer cannot be expected to question the
judgment of the legislature that passed the law. If the statute is
subsequently declared unconstitutional, excluding evidence obtained
pursuant to it prior to such a judicial declaration will not deter future
Fourth Amendment violations by an officer who has simply fulfilled
his responsibility to enforce the statute as written. To paraphrase the
Court's comment in Leon: "Penalizing the officer for the [legislature's]

255. Id. at 989.
256. Id. at 989-90.
257. See id at 989.
258. 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
259. Id. at 358-61.
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error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence
of Fourth Amendment violations." 260
In short, the Court upheld the search because the detective "relied,
in objective good faith, on a statute that appeared legitimately to allow a
warrantless administrative search." 2 6 1 Likewise, a search should be
upheld when an officer relies in objective good faith on a magistrate who
is informed of all of the circumstances and approves of a search by
issuing a warrant.
3. Arizona v. Evans
The Supreme Court expanded the good-faith exception to cover
mistakes by court employees in Arizona v. Evans.2 6 2 Specifically, the
Court held that the exclusionary rule was not applicable to evidence
obtained after a police officer arrested Evans based on a computer check
of a police record that erroneously indicated that Evans had an
outstanding warrant for his arrest. 2 6 3 The Court explained that "[i]f court
employees were responsible for the erroneous computer record, the
exclusion of evidence at trial would not sufficiently deter future errors so
as to warrant such a severe sanction [as exclusion]."26 In addition, the
Court stated:
If it were indeed a court clerk who was responsible for the erroneous
entry on the police computer, application of the exclusionary rule also
could not be expected to alter the behavior of the arresting officer. As
the trial court in this case stated: "I think the police officer [was] bound
to arrest. I think he would [have been] derelict in his duty if he failed
to arrest." 265
In short, the Court held that the good-faith exception applied
because there was "no indication that the arresting officer was not acting
objectively reasonably when he relied upon the police computer
record." 2 6 6 Significantly, the Court declined to address the contention of
amicus curiae that Leon would also apply if police personnel had been
responsible for the error.2 6 7 The Court certainly could have taken the

260. Id at 349-50 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 (1984)).
261. 1d at 360.
262. 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
263. See id. at 3-5, 15-16.
264. Id. at 14.
265.

Id. at 15 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

266. Id. at 15-16.
267. Id. at 16 n.5. The Court declined to address the issue because the record did not
adequately present the issue for consideration. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2020

27

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 10

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

788

[Vol. 48:761

opportunity to definitively state that the good-faith exception did not
apply when the police were responsible for the error if that was the rule.
4. Kyllo v. United States
The Supreme Court gave a further hint that the good-faith exception
would apply to a search warrant based on a prior improper search in
Kyllo v. United States.268 In that case, police officers conducted an
illegal search by using a thermal imaging machine to detect heat inside a
house and then presented the scan's results to a magistrate in a warrant
application. 62 9The Court held that the use of the thermal scan was
unconstitutional and remanded to the district court "to determine
whether, without the evidence [the thermal scan] provided, the search
warrant issued in this case was supported by probable cause-and if not,
whether there is any other basis for supporting admission of the evidence
that the search pursuant to the warrant produced." 27 0 Although the Court
did not mention it by name, the good-faith exception would clearly be a
possible "other basis" for admission of the evidence.2 7 1
5. Hudson v. Michigan
In Hudson v. Michigan,2 7 2 the Supreme Court eliminated any
perceived notion that the exclusionary rule is always applicable when the
police are at fault for an illegal search. The Court did so by holding that
the exclusionary rule does not apply when officers violate the Fourth
Amendment's knock-and-announce rule while executing a search
warrant. 2 73 The Court stated:
Suppression of evidence . . has always been our last resort, not our
first impulse. The exclusionary rule generates substantial social costs
which sometimes include setting the guilty free and the dangerous at
large. We have therefore been cautious against expanding it and have
repeatedly emphasized that the rule's costly toll upon truth-seeking and
268.
269.
270.

533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Id. at 29-30.
Idat40-41.

271.

See generally Kenneth C. Halcom, Illegal Predicate Searches and the Good Faith

Exception, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 467, 473-74, 476-77, 493-94 (2007) ("Obviously, the good faith
exception is one possible basis for admission of the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant, but it
would be dangerous to infer from this sentence that the Court intended to express a firm view on the
subject.").
272. 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
273. Id at 589-90, 599. The knock-and-announce rule requires officers executing a search
warrant to "announce their presence and provide residents an opportunity to open the door" unless
there exists "a threat of physical violence," there is "reason to believe evidence would likely be
destroyed" if the officers give notice to the residents, or if announcing their presence would be
"futile." See id. at 589-90 (citations omitted).
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law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging
[its] application. We have rejected [i]ndiscriminate application of the
rule and have held it to be applicable only where its remedial
objectives are thought most efficaciously served-that is, where its
deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs. 274
Further, the Court stated that it could not "assume that exclusion in
this context is necessary deterrence simply because we found that it was
necessary deterrence in different contexts and long ago. That would be
forcing the public today to pay for the sins and inadequacies of a legal
regime that existed almost half a century ago."2 7 5 Whatever the original
goals of the exclusionary rule may have been, the Court signaled in
Hudson that deterrence is the only remaining goal and it should be used
only as a last resort.2 7 6
6. Herringv. United States
The Supreme Court extended the good-faith exception even further
for law enforcement mistakes in Herringv. United States.2 7 7 In that case,
police officers in one jurisdiction had the sheriffs office in another
jurisdiction check its database and the officers were told that there was
an outstanding warrant for Herring, who was then arrested.2 78
Methamphetamine and a firearm were found during the search incident
to Herring's arrest. 2 7 9 The report of the outstanding warrant was wrong,
and the warrant should have been removed from the records, but "[f]or
whatever reason," had not been.2 80
The Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule did not apply
because "the error was the result of isolated negligence attenuated from
the arrest." 2 8 1 But more significant than this specific holding, the Court
stated that "suppression is not an automatic consequence of a Fourth
Amendment violation. Instead, the question turns on the culpability of
the police and the potential of exclusion to deter wrongful police
conduct." 2 82 The Court then set forth a general rule:
274.
275.
276.

Id. at 591 (alterations in original) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 597.
See Zachary C. Bolitho, Specifically Authorized by Binding Precedent Does Not Mean

Suggested by Persuasive Precedent: Applying the Good-Faith Exception After Davis v. United

States, 118 W. VA. L. REv. 643, 653 (2015) ("Whereas the exclusionary rule was initially viewed as
serving the dual purposes of deterrence and the maintenance ofjudicial integrity, Hudson not so
covertly signaled that deterrence was the principal rationale going forward.").
277. 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
278. Id. at 137.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 137-38.
281. Id. at 137.
282. Id.
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To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently
deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently
culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice
system. As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter
deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some
circumstances recurring or systemic negligence. The error in this case
213
does not rise to that level.
The Court concluded by stating:
In light of our repeated holdings that the deterrent effect of suppression
must be substantial and outweigh any harm to the justice system, we
conclude that when police mistakes are the result of negligence such as
that described here, rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of
constitutional requirements, any marginal deterrence does not "pay its
way." In such a case, the criminal should not "go free because the
constable has blundered."

284

A police officer who executes a search in an objectively reasonable
manner and then obtains a search warrant after fully disclosing the
circumstances to a magistrate is not acting in a manner that is deliberate,
reckless, or grossly negligent.2 8 5
7. Davis v. United States
The Supreme Court built on Herring's general rule and recognized
even broader application of the good-faith exception in Davis v. United
States. 2 8 6In that case, police stopped a vehicle in which Davis was a
passenger and ended up arresting him for giving a false name and the
driver for driving while intoxicated. 2 8 7 The officers then relied on
binding appellate precedent to search the car pursuant to an arrest and
288
Two
they discovered a firearm belonging to Davis in the vehicle.
years later, while Davis's subsequent conviction was on appeal, the
Supreme Court ruled that this sort of vehicle search was
unconstitutional. 2 8 9 Thus, the question for the court was whether the
exclusionary rule should apply to prohibit the introduction of the
evidence against Davis where the evidence was obtained as the result of

283.
284.
and then
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Id. at 144.
Id at 147-48 (first quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 n.6, 909-10 (1984);
quoting People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926)).
See id. at 144-48.
564 U.S. 229 (2011).
Id. at 235.
Id.
See id at 233-35 (citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009)).
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a search that complied with then binding precedent that later was
overruled. 2 9 0 The Court held that it should not.291
The Court explained that, "[b]ecause suppression would do nothing
to deter police misconduct in these circumstances, and because it would
come at a high cost to both the truth and the public safety, we hold that
searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding
appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule."2 9 2 The
Court further stated:
The basic insight of the Leon line of cases is that the deterrence
benefits of exclusion "var[y] with the culpability of the law
enforcement conduct" at issue. When the police exhibit "deliberate,"
"reckless," or "grossly negligent" disregard for Fourth Amendment
rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh
the resulting costs. But when the police act with an objectively
"reasonable good-faith belief' that their conduct is lawful, or when
their conduct involves only simple, "isolated" negligence, the
"'deterrence rationale loses much of its force,"' and exclusion cannot
"pay its way." 293
In short, the "cost-benefit analysis in exclusion cases [focuses] the
inquiry on the 'flagrancy of the police misconduct' at issue." 2 94 A police
officer who executes a search in an objectively reasonable manner and
then obtains a search warrant after fully disclosing the circumstances to
a magistrate is not acting with the sort of flagrant misconduct that
qualifies for the exclusion of evidence under Davis.
8. Heien v. North Carolina
In most cases where an officer performs an improper search and
uses the result of the search to seek a search warrant, the officer has
made a mistake about the law regarding searches and seizures.2 95
Although the case did not involve a warrant, the Supreme Court
290. Id. at 232.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 238 (alteration in original) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143
(2009); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 n.6, 909, 919 (1984)).
294. Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 911).
295. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 854 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 2017) (police officer
"belie[ved] that [an] apartment-building stairwell qualified as a 'public place' within the meaning of
the open-container law"); United States v. Song Ja Cha, 597 F.3d 995, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010)
("[O]ficers ...

did not realize that a seizure must last 'no longer than reasonably necessary for the

police, acting with diligence, to obtain the warrant."'); United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 211
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (stating that the "foot soldiers of the Watergate Break-in" claimed to sincerely
"believe[] the operation to be a 'national security' mission, authorized by a 'government
intelligence agency"').
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addressed the consequences of a search and seizure based on a mistake
29 6
of law in Heien v. North Carolina. That case began when an officer
29 7
The officer
stopped a vehicle for having one faulty brake light.
a sandwich
in
cocaine
found
and
car
the
search
to
obtained consent
298
the law
that
belief
his
in
However, the officer was mistaken
bag.
2 99
required two working brake lights when, in fact, it required one. Thus,
the issue was whether reasonable suspicion for a seizure can be based on
3
o The Supreme Court held that
a mistaken understanding of the lawo.
1
30
it can.
The Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that, "[a]s the text
indicates and we have repeatedly affirmed, the ultimate touchstone of
3 02
The Court went on to
the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness."
and so the Fourth
perfect,
be
to
not
emphasize that, "[t]o be reasonable is
of government
part
Amendment allows for some mistakes on the
officials, giving them 'fair leeway for enforcing the law in the
community's protection."' 30 3 The Court had "little difficulty concluding
that the officer's error of law was reasonable," and therefore the
3 Under this reasoning, the
exclusionary rule was not applicable.
good-faith exception should apply when an officer makes a reasonable
mistake in conducting a search and then fully discloses the
circumstances to a magistrate in order to obtain a search warrant.
9. Utah v. Strieff
The Supreme Court limited the exclusionary rule even further in
Utah v. Strieff3 0 5 That case began when a police officer made an
unconstitutional suspicionless stop of Strieff, discovered that Strieff had
an outstanding warrant for his arrest, and then found methamphetamine
3 06
in the subsequent search incident to arrest. The Court held that the
307
exclusionary rule did not apply and the evidence was admissible.
The Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule did not apply
because "the evidence [the officer] seized as part of his search incident

296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

574 U.S. 54 (2014).
Id. at 57.
Id. at 58.
Id at 58-59.
See id. at 60.
Id
Id (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381 (2014)).
Id at 60-61 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
Id at 67-68.
136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
Id at 2059-60.
Id at 2060, 2064.
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to arrest is admissible because his discovery of the arrest warrant
attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and the evidence
seized from Strieff incident to arrest." 0 8The Court noted that the officer
"was at most negligent" and had made "good-faith mistakes." 3 0 9 Indeed,
the Court stated that "it is especially significant that there is no evidence
that [the officer's] illegal stop reflected flagrantly unlawful
police misconduct." 3 10
Significantly, the . Court emphasized that "once [the officer]
discovered the warrant, he had an obligation to arrest Strieff." 3 11 This
is because:
A warrant is a judicial mandate to an officer to conduct a search or
make an arrest, and the officer has a sworn duty to carry out its
provisions. [The officer's] arrest of Strieff thus was a ministerial act
that was independently compelled by the pre-existing warrant. And
once [the officer] was authorized to arrest Strieff, it was undisputedly
lawful to search Strieff as an incident of his arrest to protect [the
officer's] safety. 3 12

Essentially, the Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply
when an officer's misstep is followed by the perfectly lawful action of
executing an arrest warrant. 3 13 Likewise, the good-faith exception should
apply when an officer's misstep in conducting an improper search is
followed by the perfectly lawful action of disclosing all of the
circumstances and obtaining a search warrant.
B. Policy
General policy considerations indicate that the good-faith exception
should be applied when a warrant is based on a prior improper search as
long as the prior search was objectively reasonable and the warrant
affidavit truthfully conveys the circumstances of the prior search to the
magistrate. The justice system is built on the policy that a police officer
should trust the decision of a fully-informed magistrate who issues a
search warrant. 3 14Indeed, the Supreme Court stated that a police officer
should not be expected to "question the magistrate's probable-cause

308. Id. at 2064.
309. Id. at 2063.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 2062.
312. Id. at 2062-63 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339
(2009); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 n.21 (1984)).
313. See id. at 2063.
314. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 921.
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determination" in Leon 3 1 5or "disbelieve a judge who has just advised
him, by word and by action, that the warrant he possesses authorizes him
3 16
to conduct the search he has requested" in Sheppard. Further, as stated
3 17
by the Second Circuit in United States v. Thomas, the magistrate has a
duty to interpret the law, and when a magistrate determines that a prior
search can form the basis for probable cause of a search warrant, "it [is]
reasonable for the officer to rely on this determination" and "[t]here is
nothing more [an] officer could .. . or should .. . [do] under these
circumstances to be sure his search would be legal.""'
Applying the good-faith exception when a warrant is based on a
prior improper search as long as the prior search was objectively
reasonable and the warrant affidavit truthfully conveys the
circumstances of the prior search to the magistrate supports the policy of
efficiency. It is far more efficient to shift the final decision of whether a
warrant is valid from the trial court to the magistrate. Indeed:
[T]hat is where [the decision] should reside, since only the magistrate
is in a position to actually prevent (rather than simply try to deter in
future cases) the violation of an individual's fourth amendment rights.
Since there has been reliance by the police on the magistrate's
approval of the warrant, suppression at trial does not . . merely put the
police back where they would have been had they not violated the
fourth amendment in the first place. Had the magistrate refused the
warrant application as inadequate, they could, in the normal case, have
obtained more evidence to support it and resubmitted it to the
magistrate. By the time the trial judge invalidates the warrant, it is too
late. Thus, from a law enforcement viewpoint, and in certain respects
from the viewpoint of a civil libertarian, it makes sense to place the
final decision in most cases in the hands ofa competent magistrate.
Placing the decision in the hands of fully-informed magistrates
reduces the number of invalid warrants and subsequent searches by
identifying problems with the warrants when the police still have an
320 This in turn saves future law
opportunity to address any deficiencies.

315.
316.
317.
318.

Id.
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 989-90 (1984).
757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1368.

319.

Craig M. Bradley, The "Good Faith Exception" Cases: Reasonable Exercise in Futility,

60 IND. L.J. 287, 292-93 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
320. Of course, this requires law-trained magistrates who can properly evaluate the legality of
a prior search. See id. at 293 ("If the Court is going to place principal reliance on magistrates to
guard civil liberties against police overreaching, then it is critical that the Court require that these
officials be trained and competent as well as 'neutral and detached."').
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enforcement and judicial resources from being spent on cases that are
required to be dismissed.
Applying the good-faith exception when a warrant is based on a
prior improper search as long as the prior search was objectively
reasonable and the warrant affidavit truthfully conveys the
circumstances of the prior search to the magistrate also prevents the trial
court from being placed in a dilemma. As noted by the Second Circuit:
Before Leon, federal courts examining the constitutionality of a search
had to choose between: (1) holding the search unconstitutional and
excluding the evidence found, thereby significantly increasing the
chances that a guilty person would go free, regardless of the
heinousness of the crime at issue, or (2) finding the search
constitutional, thereby condoning similar searches and injuring
potentially
innocent
objects
of
future,
highly
intrusiveinvestigations. 32 1

Applying the good-faith exception in this circumstance prevents the
trial judge from being placed in this dilemma by allowing the police to
correct the problem before the search occurs, as noted above. It also
spares the trial judge from this dilemma even when the magistrate has
erred in issuing a warrant by allowing the trial judge to correct the
magistrate and provide guidance for the future without the cost of letting
the guilty go free.3 2 2
Lastly, applying the good-faith exception is consistent with the
policy that exclusion of evidence is a "last resort" to be used only
"where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial socialcosts." 3 2 3
As the Supreme Court stated in Leon, deterrence can be achieved by
applying the exclusionary rule "only if it can be said that the law
enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with
knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment." 324 "Penalizing the officer for the magistrate's error, rather
than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth
Amendment violations." 3 2 5Excluding evidence when a warrant is based
on a prior improper search when the search was objectively reasonable

321.

United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1273 (2d Cir. 1996).

322. See id. ("Where good faith exists, courts may thus correct erring magistrates and provide
them with guidance without incurring the social cost of letting the guilty profit from decisions that
define the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment.").

323.

See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (citation omitted) (internal quotations

omitted).

324. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1984) (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422
U.S. 531, 542 (1975)).
325. Id. at 921 (citations omitted).
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and the warrant affidavit truthfully conveyed the circumstances of the
prior search to the magistrate does not promote deterrence. Rather,
excluding evidence is equivalent to closing the stable door after the
horse has bolted.3 26
VI.

CONCLUSION

The failure of the Supreme Court in Leon to address the good-faith
exception for warrants based on a prior improper search has led to a
confused mixture of rules that depend on where a case is filed. This
situation is untenable in a modem age when crimes and investigations
frequently cross jurisdictional boundaries. Both defendants and law
3 27
As Wayne
enforcement officials are entitled to consistent rules.
and
searches
unreasonable
[from
"[S]ecurity
stated,
has
LaFave
rules
of
set
a
under
acting
are
police
the
if
seizures] can only be realized
which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct
determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is
3 28
justified in the interest of law enforcement."
From Sheppard to Strieff, the Supreme Court's post-Leon cases
have been consistent in holding that objective reasonableness is the
guiding principle of when it comes to analyzing the exclusionary rule
and the good-faith exception.329 Likewise, the cases have made it clear
that the only current purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterrence of
police misconduct, and the deterrence does not work when the police
330
rely in good faith on the decisions of magistrates. Any rule regarding
the application of the good-faith exception to warrants following an
improper predicate search must be based on these principles.
The only fair rule based on these principles is one holding that the
good-faith exception applies when the prior search was objectively
reasonable and the warrant affidavit truthfully conveyed the
circumstances of the prior improper search to the magistrate. This is the
rule that best fits the "basic insight of the Leon line of cases .. . that the
deterrence benefits of exclusion 'var[y] with the culpability of the law
33
enforcement conduct' at issue." 1 An officer who performs a predicate
326. See generally Bradley, supra note 318, at 294 ("Still, if one agrees with the Court's
assumption that deterrence is the purpose of exclusion, and if deterrence does not work in these

cases, then excluding the evidence would simply be shutting the barn door after the horse is gone.").
327.

See Wayne LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures":

The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 141-42 (1974).
328. Id. at 142.
329.
330.

331.

See supra Part V.A.
SeesupraPartV.A.

Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555
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search in an objectively reasonable manner and then fully discloses the
circumstances of the search in an application for a search warrant has no
"culpability" and thus, nothing worth deterring. As stated by the
Supreme Court, "[s]uppression of evidence. .. has always been our last
resort, not our first impulse" and should "be applicable only where its
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served, that is, where
its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs."3 3 2
An officer acts in good faith when the predicate search was "close
enough to the line of validity to make the officers' beliefin the validity
of the warrant objectively reasonable" and "a reasonably well trained
officer would [not] have known that the search was illegal." 333 Because
the exclusionary rule only applies to "deliberate, reckless, or grossly
negligent conduct,"3 3 4 the good-faith exception applies.33 5
Policy considerations also indicate that the good-faith exception
should apply when the prior search was objectively reasonable and the
warrant affidavit truthfully conveyed the circumstances of the prior
improper search to the magistrate.336 Police officers should not be
expected to "question the magistrate's probable-cause determination," 3 37
or "disbelieve a judge who has just advised him, by word and by action,
that the warrant he possesses authorizes him to conduct the search he has
requested." 33 8 The best rule is one that encourages an officer to fully
disclose the circumstances of a predicate search to a magistrate in a
search warrant affidavit so deficiencies in the warrant application can be
addressed before evidence is seized and a suspect is charged in a case
that is subsequently dismissed.3 3 9
Of course, nothing in this proposed rule should be read to excuse or
encourage deliberate illegal searches. Wise police officers should keep
in mind that juries tend to have an innate sense of what is fair and what
is not. 34 0 An officer who conducts a purposefully improper search and
U.S. 135, 143 (2009)).
332. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (citations and quotations omitted).
333. See United States v. Hopkins, 824 F.3d 726, 733 (8th Cir. 2016) (first quoting United
States v. Cannon, 703 F.3d 407, 413 (8th Cir. 2013); and then quoting United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 922 n.23 (1984)).
334. Herring, 555 U.S. at 144.
335. See id. at 142.
336.

See supra Part V.B.

337.
338.

Leon, 468 U.S. at 921.
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 989-90 (1984).

339.
340.

See supra PartV.B.
See Mike Reck, A Community with No Conscience: The FurtherReduction of a Jury's

Right to Nullify in People v. Sanchez, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 285, 307 (1999) ("In order for a jury to
perform its function as the community conscience, the jurors must bring with them a sense of
fairness."); Paul M. Secunda, A Public Interest Model for Applying Lost Chance Theory to
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then uses the results to obtain a warrant runs the risk that the jury will
conclude that the officer engaged in unfair conduct. Research has shown
that even strangers who observe one party acting unfairly towards
341
another will attempt to punish the person who is acting unfairly. No
officer wants to be punished by a jury with a not guilty verdict for what
is perceived to be unfair conduct.
Civil War General Thomas F. Meagher once stated: "Great interests
demand great safeguards." 3 4 2 Consistency in the criminal justice system
is one of the greatest interests. 3 4 3 It is time for the Supreme Court to
safeguard this interest by establishing clear rules for analyzing the
application of the good-faith exception to warrants based on improper
predicate searches. In doing so, the Court should be guided by its own
counsel that, "[t]o be reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth
Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part of government
leeway for enforcing the law in the
officials, giving them 'fair
34 4
protection."'
community's

ProbabilisticInjuries in Employment DiscriminationCases, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 747, 761 (2005)
("[Jiuries are commonly asked to rely on their innate sense of fairness and common sense.").
341. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOw 299-300 (2011) (ebook). In fact,
studies have shown that this sort of altruistic punishment of unfair behavior increases activity in the
pleasure centers of the brain. Id.
342. MICHAEL CAVANAGH, MEMOIRS OF GEN. THOMAS FRANCIS MEAGHER 61 (1892).

343. LaFave, supra note 327, at 141-43.
344. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60-61 (2014) (quoting Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
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